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INTRODUCTION 
Public participation and collaboration in federal forest management has 
evolved over the last century. Currently, the federal land management 
agencies are encouraged through statutes and regulations1 to actively and 
meaningfully collaborate with the public during project development and 
implementation. The hope is that through greater public engagement, the 
management gridlock that has impeded forest restoration and thinning since 
the 1990s will be reduced. It is also assumed that as a result of collaboration, 
environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
will be improved leading to better natural resource management decisions.2 
The Four Forest Restoration Initiative (4FRI), a collaborative effort to restore 
2.4 million acres of ponderosa pine forest across four national forests in 
northern Arizona,3 is an example of how collaboration can lower conflict and 
create agreements that help avoid delays caused by litigation.4 
I. EARLY HISTORY OF THE FOREST SERVICE  
 
Westward expansion and settlement—in the mid to late 1800s—fueled by 
the belief that wilderness should be tamed—often resulted in the unbridled 
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exploitation of natural resources.5 In response, and in association with the 
progressive era of the late 1800s, national forest reserves were set aside to 
protect forest and water resources and regulate activity.6 These reserves were 
early steps toward formally establishing the U.S. Forest Service in 1905. The 
purpose established for national forests was to preserve water supplies, 
preserve the forests, and provide a supply of timber.7 These core goals remain 
relevant today. In addition, the Forest Service uniquely positioned itself to be 
a revenue generator for the federal government by establishing that timber 
would be managed and auctioned with the proceeds going to the government.8 
A significant factor in the evolution of the Forest Service was the selection 
of Gifford Pinchot, a European trained forester, as the first Chief of the Forest 
Service. He focused early efforts on watershed management, forest regulation 
and wildfire prevention and suppression. Pinchot restructured and 
professionalized the management of the national forests, as well as greatly 
increased the number of national forests.9 The progressive era embraced the 
idea that science should inform decision-making and Pinchot believed that 
professionals were needed to ensure quality management. When judged in 
the context of the time this makes sense and can be viewed as intellectual 
progress and enlightenment. However, by the 1960s the attitude that the 
Forest Service is the sole judge of national forest management was 
vehemently challenged by the environmental and conservation movement.  
II. WORLD WAR II: A PROSPEROUS NATION BUILDS HOMES 
During and after World War II there was a massive demand for wood to 
support the war effort and supply material for a post-war housing boom. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the upward trend in wood sold and harvested starting with 
the war and ending in the late 1980s.10  
 
Figure 1. Timber Sold and Harvested.11 
 
Not only were Americans consuming more with their new post-war 
prosperity, but they also used their growing discretionary income and time to 
pursue leisure time activities like traveling to the national forests.12 Not all 
visitors were happy with what they found. Some were alarmed by the impacts 
of logging and the impacts it had on non-timber values such as wildlife habitat 
and recreation.13 During this time some conservationists and citizens began 
challenging land management decisions in the courts.14 In response, Congress 
passed the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 to balance non-
commodity uses of the national forests for purposes such as recreation and 
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11. Id. 
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wildlife.15 Also during that period and following thirty years of effort, 
Congress passed the Wilderness Act in 1964.16 Another sign of the popular 
national support for permanently setting aside public lands for recreation and 
habitat and ensuring that some public land would never be exploited for 
natural resources. 
III. THE BIRTH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 
As interest in the out-of-doors grew throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the 
membership in organizations like the Wilderness Society and Sierra Club 
grew as well.17 However, despite increasing environmental awareness and 
public criticism of federal forest management, environmentally harmful 
commercial logging continued in the national forests. By the late 1960s the 
environmental movement had the popular support and the political 
momentum to motivate Congress to pass several major pieces of 
environmental legislation designed to increase environmental protection, 
public participation, and transparency in federal land management decision-
making. These laws included: 
 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969 (Public 
Law 91-190). Considered the Magna Carta of environmental 
legislation.18  
 The Endangered Species Act, passed in 1973 (Public Law 93-205), 
provides the vehicle for protecting threatened and endangered 
species.19 
 The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) in 1976, which 
becomes the primary legal framework for managing national 
forests (Public Law 94-588).20 
Although litigation existed prior to the passage of these laws, the laws 
became a powerful tool to challenge the government and the impacts of the 
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logging industry in order to address environmental concerns. This led to an 
increase in litigation, particularly in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 2. Environmental litigation.  
 
The Forest Service files more EISs than any other federal agency.21 In the 
courts, the Forest Service was shown in one study to have a higher success 
rate than that of all other litigant types;22 however, when the Forest Service 
does lose it is often because of a failure to follow a procedural or compliance 
requirement.23 The Forest Service has responded to this problem by creating 
voluminous NEPA documents to guard against procedural challenges.24 
Unfortunately, as a result of more attention paid to procedural requirements 
less attention is devoted to the substantive environmental and 
interdisciplinary goals envisioned in NEPA.25 The Forest Service itself 
asserted in a 2002 paper titled The Process Predicament,  
                                                                                                                            
21. Amanda M.A. Miner et al., Twenty Years of Forest Service National Environmental 
Policy Act Legislation, 12 ENVTL. PRAC. 116, 116 (2010).  
22. Id. at 123–24. 
23. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Dep’t of Agric., 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (D. Wyo. 2008) (enjoining 
the Forest Service’s Roadless Rule because the agency violated NEPA procedure by denying 
requests to extend the scoping period, failing to explore alternatives, and failing to prepare a 
supplemental EIS after making “substantial” changes to the proposed action). 
24. E.g., U.S. FOREST SERV., supra note 15. 
25. Id. at 5. 
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that too often, the Forest Service is so busy meeting procedural 
requirements, such as preparing voluminous plans, studies, and 
associated documentation, that it has trouble fulfilling its historic 
mission: to sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the 
nation’s forests and grasslands to meet the needs of present and 
future generations. Too frequently, the paralysis results in 
catastrophe.26 
Legal actions challenging forest management contributed to a decline in 
commercial logging on the national forests beginning in 1990.27 However, as 
the ability to cut and manage forests imploded, forest health was eroding 
precipitously throughout the ponderosa pine dominated ecosystems of the 
West.28 The changes that led to the decline began at the turn of the 20th 
century as a result of the over-harvesting of old and large trees, livestock 
over-grazing, and fire suppression (eliminating even beneficial, re-
invigorating surface fire that limited the number of trees that could 
successfully become established).29 These changes allowed an unprecedented 
number of pines to germinate and grow.30 The overpopulation of trees was 
largely ignored by land managers until the late 1980s and 1990s when the 
frequency, severity, and size of wildfires drastically changed.31 Fires that 
were easily suppressed in the forest in the 1960s and 1970s were manifesting 
such extreme behavior.32 As a result of all the fuel in the forest, fires could 
travel quickly into communities where homes were now intermixed in the 
forest at the community edge.33 
By the late 1990s the federal government and the U.S. Forest Service were 
re-examining forest management strategies and recognizing that active 
management, such as restoration-based thinning and burning would be 
necessary in order to reduce the threat of unnatural fire to forests and 
communities.34 The problem was that the environmental community didn’t 
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AMERICAN NATURE IN THE AGE OF HUMANS 133, 140 (Ben A. Minteer & Stephen J. Pyne eds., 
2015).  
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trust the Forest Service and the active management they proposed such as 
mechanical thinning.35 As a result, active management continued to be under 
assault in the courts by environmental activists.36 The environmentalists 
feared that even forest thinning that was designed to restore forest health and 
reduce the threat of wildfire could become an excuse to cut large and old trees 
in order to re-establish commercial logging and undermine conservation and 
management of national forests for non-timber values.37  
Policy discussions in Congress that advocate changes to environmental 
laws in order to expedite forest thinning are viewed by many as potentially 
dangerous38 and fraught with controversy. The fear of opening a Pandora’s 
Box that leads to unwanted changes undermines efforts to make common-
sense fixes. Recognizing the difficulty of changing policies, the federal 
agencies, individuals and interest groups began advocating for a new strategy 
to guide forest management.  
IV. COLLABORATION AS ONE SOLUTION  
Collaboration as the means to overcome conflict and build agreement on 
natural resource management increased in popularity beginning in the 
1980s.39 Although the legislation of the 1970s incorporated public 
participation as part of the environmental review process,40 the approach was 
largely reactive, with the agency describing its proposed action and the public 
responding. Collaboration is different. It is defined as “a process by which 
multiple stakeholders work together to solve a common problem or achieve 
a common goal.”41 “It involves sharing information and perceptions to 
encourage innovation and mutual learning, and is often viewed as an 
opportunity to improve planning and decision making by finding ways to 
work beyond gridlock and inefficiency.”42 Finally, at its core is the desire is 
to re-build trust between and among stakeholders and the Forest Service with 
the hope that differences can be worked out and litigation avoided. 
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38. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-71, FOREST SERVICE DECISION 
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By 2000, the idea that collaboration was essential to successful natural 
resource management became institutionalized. For example, in reaction to 
the record-breaking fire season of 2000, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 U.S. 
Senate and House Conference Report for FY 2001 Department of Interior 
stated:  
the agencies need to work closely with the affected States, including 
Governors, county officials and other citizens . . . and governments 
at all levels. The managers direct the Secretaries to engage 
Governors in a collaborative structure to cooperatively develop a 
coordinated, National ten-year comprehensive strategy with the 
States as full partners in the planning, decision making, and 
implementation of the plan. Key decisions should be made a local 
levels.43 
The Western Governors’ Association responded quickly to this direction 
by assembling a broad cross section of governmental and nongovernmental 
stakeholders to produce A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland 
Fire Risks to Communities and the Environment.44 From this point in time, 
collaboration became a regular fixture in land management policy. In 2001, 
the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act authorized 
the Collaborative Forest Restoration Program with $5 million in funding to 
accelerate restoration in New Mexico.45 Congress passed the Healthy Forest 
Restoration Act in 2004 in order to expedite forest restoration treatments and 
lower fire risk in the wildland-urban interface and watersheds.46 The law also 
requires multi-party monitoring and collaboration.47 In 2009, the 
Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program was established with 
Congress appropriating $40 million annually to achieve landscape-scale 
restoration.48 The Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration pilots (23 
across the nation) are sustained by engaged citizens, public officials, interest 
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groups and business all hoping to build the social license required to 
accelerate forest restoration and rebuild rural economies.49  
Collaboration isn’t easy. It’s often described as “going slow in order to 
move fast.”50 In other words, it takes time to come to an agreement with 
diverse stakeholders. But the hope is that time invested at the front end to 
achieve broad consensus will lead to tangible outcomes when compared to a 
history of protracted court battles or giving up. The following is a list of 
expectations from collaboration that are reported in the literature: 
 Many of the benefits of collaboration are social, not 
ecological. The most commonly reported benefit is that it 
builds social capital (creating relationships that allow 
people to work together effectively) and improves 
participants’ capacity for future collaboration. 
 Reduces conflict and builds trust. Creates interpersonal 
networks that can increase participants’ capacity for 
innovation and collective flexibility to adapt to changing 
conditions. 
 Allows projects to move forward without litigation. 
 Increases transparency, such as how and why decisions are 
made. 
 Frequently results in decisions or projects that are expected 
to improve resource conditions (better science, address 
more issues and more innovation).51 
Collaboration also comes with costs. These include:  
 Potential for lowest common denominator decisions.  
 Increased conflict.  
 Unbalanced representation. 
                                                                                                                            
49. U.S. FOREST SERV. & COLLABORATIVE FOREST LANDSCAPE RESTORATION COAL. 
STEERING COMM., PEOPLE RESTORING AMERICA’S FORESTS: 2012 REPORT ON THE 
COLLABORATIVE FOREST LANDSCAPE RESTORATION PROGRAM ii (2012), 
http://www.safnet.org/fp/CFLR_2012_Annual_Report_LR_12-19-12.pdf. 
50. Dawn O’Neil & Kerry Graham, Go Slow to Go Fast—A Mantra for Getting Started with 
Collective Impact, COLLABORATION FOR IMPACT (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://www.collaborationforimpact.com/go-slow-to-go-fast-a-mantra-for-getting-started-with-
collective-impact/. 
51. MOOTE & LOWE, supra note 39, at 6. 
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 Collaboration usually requires the government to surrender 
authority; otherwise the collaborative activity can be 
viewed as inauthentic.  
 It takes time and money. Some policy makers are concerned 
that collaboration is too slow. 52 
V. THE FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE (4FRI)  
The Four Forest Restoration Initiative, or 4FRI, provides a good 
illustration of how collaboration helped advance restoration in a normally 
contentious environment. The Four Forest Restoration Initiative is a 
collaborative effort among the four national forests that span the Mogollon 
Rim of northern Arizona (Kaibab, Coconino, Tonto, and Apache-Sitgreaves) 
and more than thirty diverse stakeholder organizations.53 The goals of 4FRI 
are to:  
 Plan and implement restoration treatments across 2.4 
million acres of ponderosa pine forest. 
 Treat 50,000 acres per year during a 20-year period. 
 Allow for increased use of prescribed fire and management 
of natural fires for restoration objectives. 
 Engage industry so the cost of restoration is covered by the 
value of the products removed. 
 Assure that the science-based and socially-acceptable 
agreements forged during the last decade result in the 
implementation of long-term, landscape-scale restoration.54  
The members of the 4FRI stakeholder group have a long history of conflict 
and collaboration. Many of the founding members of 4FRI came together in 
the late 1990s as a result of an increasing number of severe fires that 
threatened communities and created the urgency and need to take action.55 
The hope was that through collaboration environmental conflict and litigation 
                                                                                                                            
52. Id. 
53. 4FRI Description, FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, 
http://www.4fri.org/description.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).  
54. 4FRI Goals, FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, http://www.4fri.org/goals.html 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
55. DAVID EGAN & ERIK NIELSEN, ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION INST. N. ARIZ. UNIV., THE 
HISTORY OF THE FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE: 1980S–2010 2–6 (Tayloe Dubay ed., 
2014), http://library.eri.nau.edu/gsdl/collect/erilibra/index/assoc/D2014031.dir/doc.pdf. 
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could be reduced or eliminated. In the Flagstaff area the Greater Flagstaff 
Forest Partnership (GFFP) was formed to advance restoration.56 The Natural 
Resources Working Group (NRWG) was the home for industry, government 
officials and activists proposing action in the White Mountains of eastern 
Arizona.57 By 2009, many of the members of these two organizations would 
organize under the banner of 4FRI.58  
The Southwest is the birthplace of the Center for Biological Diversity 
(CBD), a group well known for its effective use of environmental laws and 
litigation to challenge proposed management actions.59 In 1995, CBD filed a 
successful lawsuit that challenged forest management practices they 
considered harmful to the survival of the Mexican Spotted Owl.60 In response 
to the issues raised by CBD Federal Judge Carl Muecke ordered all logging 
to stop in all eleven forests of U.S. Forest Service Region 3.61 CBD was active 
in fighting thinning and restoration in northern Arizona and was a core 
member of the Southwest Forest Alliance, a coalition of more than fifty 
environmental organizations that has since dissolved.62 By the time 4FRI 
formed, CBD, which had not formally joined either of the existing 
collaboratives, did choose to join 4FRI.63 This set the stage for having a broad 
spectrum of interests, including potential litigants at the collaboration table 
for the first time.  
The 4FRI Stakeholder Group spent five years collaborating and 
contributing ideas to the first 4FRI Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).64 
The first EIS set an ambitious goal of analyzing one million acres of the 2.4-
million-acre 4FRI landscape to identify areas suitable for restoration.65 When 
                                                                                                                            
56. GREATER FLAGSTAFF FORESTS PARTNERSHIP, http://gffp.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2016). 
57. EGAN & NIELSEN, supra note 55, at 3.  
58. Id. at 19. 
59. Our Story, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/about/story/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).  
60. Saving the Mexican Spotted Owl, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/birds/Mexican_spotted_owl/ (last visited Feb. 14, 
2016). 
61. Shea Andersen, Owl Shuts down the Southwest, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Sept. 4, 1995), 
http://www.hcn.org/issues/42/1276. 
62. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Old Growth Logging on North Rim of 
Grand Canyon Proposed While Community Protection Projects Go Unfunded (Aug. 7, 2003), 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/grand8-7-03.html. 
63. Stakeholders, FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, 
http://www.4fri.org/stakeholders.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2016). 
64. 4FRI Planning, U.S. FOREST SERV., http://www.fs.usda.gov/main/4fri/planning (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
65. Id. 
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the EIS was released, it advocated restoration treatments that included 
mechanical thinning and prescribed burning on almost 600,000 acres.66 For 
some, this approach represented a major breakthrough in forest management 
because for the first time the Forest Service was analyzing the forest health 
and fire problem at the scale it needed.67  
During the first five years of collaboration, pressure was exerted on the 
Forest Service to increase their collaborative performance and engagement 
with the stakeholders.68 Whereas some members felt that anything agreed on 
by the Stakeholder Group should be adopted by the Forest Service in its 
totality, federal laws such as NEPA made it impossible for the Forest Service 
to meet those demands.69 This dynamic resulted in back and forth 
conversations that helped create a positive evolution toward more document 
sharing, accessibility, and transparency as the EIS progressed toward 
completion. Fundamentally, it was the goal of the stakeholders and the Forest 
Service to create a document that the Stakeholder Group would endorse with 
100 percent consensus so that there was a clear demonstration of support for 
restoration and litigation would possibly be avoided.70 Because several 
litigious groups were not at the collaborative table and given the low 
threshold for standing to object to the EIS the group worked diligently with 
cautious, but realistic, optimism.  
VI. HOW DID THE FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE (4FRI) 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP DO AS A COLLABORATIVE PARTNERSHIP? 
Comparing the 4FRI Stakeholder Group performance to the expectations 
for collaboration discussed in Section V, supra, shows that 4FRI generally 
benefited from collaboration. If collaboration was the actual reason that 
delay-causing litigation of the largest EIS proposing mechanical thinning at 
                                                                                                                            
66. Press Release, U.S. Forest Serv., Forest Service Issues Decision on Historic Effort to 
Restore Forests on a Half Million Acres; More than 30 Stakeholder Groups Joined the Project 
(Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/coconino/news-events/?cid=STELPRD3835399. 
67. Press Release, U.S. Forest Serv., Largest Forest Service Restoration Initiative Reaches 
Milestone (Apr. 20, 2015, 1:45 PM), http://www.fs.fed.us/news/releases/largest-forest-service-
restoration-initiative-reaches-milestone. 
68. See FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, 4FRI STAKEHOLDER GROUP MEETING 
MINUTES 4 (2015), 
http://4fri.org/pdfs/meetings/stakeholders/stakeholder_meeting_notes_050510.pdf. 
69. FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, THE 4FRI ADVANCE: LESSONS LEARNED AND 
MOVING FORWARD 4 (2015), 
http://www.4fri.org/pdfs/meetings/stakeholders/advance_meeting_notes_05272815.pdf .  
70. See U.S. Forest Serv., supra note 66. 
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the landscape scale was avoided, then collaboration was a resounding 
success.  
Overall the group’s relationships and ability to work together improved 
over time.71 This was particularly true in small working groups where 
considerable social capital accrued. One example of the strength of 
relationships both within the group and between the group and the Forest 
Service was the completion of an “Adaptive Management and Monitoring 
Plan” that was included almost verbatim in the final, signed EIS.72 
The 4FRI Stakeholder Group held a retreat in May 2015 following the 
successful completion of the first EIS to reflect on the previous five years, to 
articulate lessons learned from that experience, and to identify 
recommendations to improve the collaborative process and the second EIS.73 
In the pre-retreat interviews conducted by a third-party neutral facilitator, 
members identified commitment and resiliency as two positive 
characteristics of the group.74 However, they also identified problems with 
group dysfunction including persistent lack of trust between members and 
some members and the Forest Service, a lack of respect by some individuals, 
the perpetuation of personal agendas, an un-level playing field when one 
group has more power than another and a problem with a few individuals 
dominating the conversation.75 These problems are not new and have vexed 
the process since the beginning. 
The group also felt that the transparency of Forest Service decision-
making through the NEPA process improved at the local level but was poor 
at the regional level.76 Some individuals also asked for more transparency in 
the awarding of thinning contracts.77 The size, selection, and management of 
thinning contracts are a persistent topic of concern by many members of 
4FRI.78  
                                                                                                                            
71. See FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, 4FRI STAKEHOLDER MEETING MINUTES 5 
(2015), http://4fri.org/pdfs/meetings/stakeholders/stakeholder_meeting_notes_042215.pdf. 
72. 1st Environmental Impact Statement (2011–2015), FOUR FOREST RESTORATION 
INITIATIVE, http://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/4fri/planning/?cid=stelprdb5361003 (last visited Feb. 
11, 2016). 
73. FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, supra note 71, at 6. 
74. BRYCE ESCH, SW. DECISION RES., ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION INST. N. ARIZ. UNIV., 
RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MAY 2015 4FRI RETREAT: 4FRI ASSESSMENT 
INTERVIEW SUMMARY RESULTS (forthcoming 2016), http://www.nau.edu/eri/publications-
media/white-papers/.  
75. Id. 
76. FOUR FOREST RESTORATION INITIATIVE, supra note 71, at 6. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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The Forest Service and the Stakeholder Group agree that the final EIS was 
improved through collaboration.79 One of the most valuable services 
performed by the stakeholders was testing the integrity of the draft EIS 
against common mistakes that lead to process-based objections and 
litigation.80 For example, the group was concerned about whether or not a 
document of this size could meet the standard for “site specificity.”81 A subset 
of stakeholders tested the document and found that it did meet the standard 
but that it could be improved by making several changes.82 This not only 
helped to improve the quality of the document but also sent a signal to 
organizations watching 4FRI that the document was buttressed against 
attacks based on this particular standard for compliance.83  
With regard to potential “costs” of collaboration both stakeholders and the 
Forest Service will admit that the EIS took a lot of time, as well as human 
and financial resources.84 Also, it is not a perfect document with regard to the 
science that supports restoration. But a number of uncontrollable factors 
cause that phenomenon, not the least of which is compliance with federal 
laws that in some places works at cross-purposes with restoration. In addition, 
some stakeholder agreements designed to limit some tree thinning in order to 
build support also sub-optimize full restoration.85 However, when compared 
to doing nothing and succumbing to catastrophic fire those issues are small 
compared to moving the entire project forward.  
The literature on collaboration mentions that there can be unbalanced 
representation in a collaborative that will influence outcomes.86 This was the 
case in 4FRI as well. There were organizations with funding that enabled 
more participation and more influence for that organization. Other 
imbalances included individuals and a group with the backing of local elected 
officials who would use that power to exert influence outside the 
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86. Matthew Alan Koschmann, Communication in Collaborative Interorganizational 
Relationships: A Field Study of Leadership and Stakeholder Participation (May 2008) 
(unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin), 
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collaborative. Finally, there are the litigious groups that would inject 
menacing threats of litigation if an outcome did not meet their objectives. 
One reality of collaboration is that it rarely represents the entire public 
spectrum of interests. The Forest Service is required to consider all public 
input through the NEPA process.87 Therefore, it is difficult for the Forest 
Service to require or to keep everyone at the collaboration table in order to 
identify consensus on issues. It is logical to assume that the Forest Service 
would give more weight to a consensus recommendation from a stakeholder 
group representing more than thirty groups and hours of collaboration; 
however, collaboration does not remove or diminish the public involvement 
requirements by the Forest Service in order to comply with NEPA.  
Finally, the Forest Service consistently reminded the 4FRI Stakeholder 
Group that federal law requires that final decision-making authority belonged 
to the Forest Service. What the Forest Service did yield in terms of authority 
to the Stakeholder Group was more opportunity to engage in the preparation 
of the document in order to create a cooperative and collaborative dialogue 
as opposed to a reactive, one-way discussion. In the end there was general 
agreement that this contributed to a better document with wider acceptance.  
VII. DID COLLABORATION WORK? 
Following the release of the Final EIS and Draft Record of Decision 
(ROD) the 4FRI Stakeholder Group passed a major collaborative milestone 
by sending a letter to the Forest Service unanimously endorsing the Final EIS 
and Draft ROD.88 It was a common refrain among the group that five years 
ago it seemed impossible that we would ever achieve that level of support.  
For many decades the Forest Service has used a post-decisional 
administrative appeal process to address challenges to an EIS. In 2014, a new 
pre-decisional objection process was initiated.89 The administrative review 
occurs prior to the issuance of a final ROD on a proposed project.90 After 
receiving qualified objections to the draft ROD (as outlined in the 
procedures) the deciding officer has the discretion to conduct public 
                                                                                                                            
87. How Citizens Can Comment and Participate in the National Environmental Policy Act 
Process, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/nepa/how-citizens-can-comment-and-participate-national-
environmental-policy-act-process (last updated Nov. 2, 2015). 
88. Press Release, 4FRI, 4FRI Stakeholder Group Response to Final EIS and Final ROD 
(Jan. 16, 2015), 
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89. 36 C.F.R. § 218.1 (2016).  
90. SUSAN BROWN, ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL REVIEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
COLLABORATIVE GROUPS 3 (Ecological Restoration Inst. et al. eds., 2015).  
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resolution meetings with the objectors to resolve outstanding differences.91 
The new pre-decisional agreement was applied to the first 4FRI EIS.92 
There were nine objections to the 4FRI EIS.93 The Center for Biological 
Diversity’s objection was the only one filed by a formal member of the 4FRI 
Stakeholder Group.94 The Sierra Club filed an objection as well,95 but is not 
a formal member although a representative regularly attends meetings.96 One 
objection was rejected because the individual did not have standing.97 The 
remaining objections were filed by Wild Earth Guardians,98 the John Muir 
Project,99 and four separate individuals.100 The main issues were protection 
and monitoring of Mexican Spotted Owls (MSO), proposed restoration 
treatments in MSO Protected Activity Centers, grazing, potential health 
effects from smoke, and compliance with procedural requirements.101  
Two individual objectors chose not to participate in the public process. 
One objector used the public meeting to argue their point and then admitted 
that their concern about smoke would not be addressed. The John Muir 
Project withdrew from the process dissatisfied.102 The remaining objectors 
engaged in resolution discussions with the Forest Service. However, one 
objector subsequently filed a complaint following the Record of Decision. He 
did not request injunctive relief, which allows the project to proceed as 
planned. The Wild Earth Guardians were sufficiently satisfied to formally 
withdraw their objection.103 Throughout the public meetings the deciding 
officer (in this case the Regional Forester for Region 3) encouraged and 
engaged the 4FRI Stakeholder Group to provide comment on issues where 
the Stakeholder Group had worked on the issue of concern.104  
There were several informal observations made by the Forest Service and 
stakeholders following the objection process. The Forest Service 
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representatives noted that by having a public conversation that included a 
large number of stakeholders, the objectors were more civil than in private 
forums. Stakeholders observed that some of the objections raised by the 
objectors demonstrated a lack of familiarity with the document and the fact 
that some of their issues had already been addressed. Everyone felt that the 
objectors who did not participate in the collaborative would have benefited 
from the experience. Finally, the objections that were raised by the two 
objectors that had participated in the collaborative were more specific and 
better conceived than the other objections. In the end, the stakeholders and 
the Forest Service felt that collaboration helped resolve many issues that 
would have been raised during the objection process. In addition, there was a 
common opinion that the pre-decisional objection process is superior to the 
post-decisional process.  
The ultimate proof of success was the signing of the Final ROD on April 
17, 2015.105 And unlike so many EISs before it, the first 4FRI EIS to analyze 
almost one million acres and clear almost 600,000 acres for restoration 
treatments is being implemented.106  
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